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Contamination of groundwater by agricultural practices presents a dilemma between protecting
a vital resource and maintaining a valuable part of the economy. Policies to balance these
objectives are presented. In addition to an historical baseline, policies that ban certain
pesticides, taxes and subsidies, and control culturaI practices are also considered. A model is
developed to reflect the current state of agriculture in Eastern Suffolk County. This model
consists of a recursive programming component, which has input for it generated by a
stochastic model of Colorado potato beetle pest dynamics and management strategies to
control those pests. While income is reduced by banning pesticides, the reduction is small
when compared with the improvement in environmental quality. Further efforts to reduce
pesticide use resulted in a reduction in potato acreage and incomes, as well as yields.
Analysis concludes that improvements in both farm income and environmental quality could
be achieved through the adoption of subsidies for low-input conservation crops.
Groundwater contamination by agricultural chem-
icals is a growing concern of rural communities
(Nielsen and Lee; Fairchild). Management of ag-
ricultural chemicals presents a tradeoff between
concerns over pubIic health and environmental
quality, and a viable farm economy. Policies that
regulate pesticide use and promote cultural prac-
tices less likely to have an adverse effect on ground-
water have been avoided because of their perceived
economic costs. These policies can be analyzed for
both their economic and environmental impacts,
Agencies responsible for the protection of water
quality have been historically reluctant to regulate
agriculture. Institutions that regulate agricultural
impacts on groundwater faced uncertainties that
have impaired program development (Milon). Ad-
justment to resource policies is usually adaptive,
not instantaneous (Day). A recursive stochastic
programming model is developed to predict changes
in pesticide use, cropping patterns, and returns to
farmers. A model developed to analyze the tradeoff
between agricultural production and pollution in-
corporated stochastic elements influencing produc-
tion and pollution. The incremental changes
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associated with responses to policy are modelled
recursively. The model is then used to analyze the
likelihood of further contamination and health risk.
Aggregate production and pollution are analyzed
to evaluate alternative policies.
A number of policies proposed to protect
groundwater from agricultural pollution are pre-
sented for analysis. These inchtded modelling pro-
duction with and without a ban on pesticides; taxes
and subsidies; and district management of crop ro-
tations. The model uses Suffolk County, New York
for an empirical case study.
Located on Long Island 100 miles from New
York City, eastern Suffolk County has long been
a major center of potato production, Recent urban
growth has reduced agricultural land, with culti-
vated acreage falling from over 100,000 acres in
1954 to fewer than 30,000 in 1984, 14,000 of which
were potatoes. Town and county governments have
sought to preserve farmland in the region through
a variety of programs, including property tax re-
ductions and purchase of development rights.
Abundant potato foliage and a favorable climate
created the conditions for a severe Colorado potato
beetle (CPB) infestation. The CPB is a voracious
feeder on solanaceous crops that reproduces rapidly
on potatoes throughout the season, Resistance
problems have complicated control efforts. Pesti-
cides used to control the CPB have been found in
Suffolk County’s groundwater, the sole source of132 Oaober 1988 NJARE
drinking water for the county’s 1.5 million people
(Baier and Robbins). Three of these pesticides,
aldicarb, carbofuran, and oxamyl, have been pro-
hibited from further use on Long Island.
A baseline scenario is constructed where the
banned pesticides are assumed available. This is
then compared to the current policy, with the bans
on aldicarb, carbofuran and oxamyl. Other policies
modelled include a tax rather than a ban on pes-
ticides, a conservation subsidy for growing low
input crops, and the formation of a pest control
district. Policies other than the baseline and the
pesticide tax assume that pesticides that have been
banned or removed from the market are not avail-
able for use on Long Island. Re-registration of the
banned pesticides is widely regarded as politically
unacceptable. The baseline policy, however, pro-
vides a useful point of reference for the income
losses associated with the subsequent ban on pes-
ticides.
The Model
A recursive stochastic programming model of Long
Island’s agriculture is constructed for policy anal-
ysis. Simulations are conducted over a five year
time horizon. Resource allocation in the model is
based on recursive linear programming. The ob-
jective function of the model is
{t=l, ...5}
Farmers are assumed to be risk neutral where EIIIt]
is the expected profit in year t, pi is the price of
crop i, yik is the yield per acre of crop i on land
k; cik is the variable cost per acre of producing crop
i on land k (not counting pesticide variable costs);
xik is the number of acres of crop i grown on land
k; c+is the cost of pesticide *; and Z$kis the amount
of pesticide * used on land k. Land categories k
are divided according to fertility, climate, irriga-
tion, and cropping history: continuous potato, po-
tato/grain rotation, potato/vegetable rotation, or
continuous vegetable. Rotations are recursively
linked. Activities included potatoes; field crops such
as rye, wheat, oats, soybeans, field corn, dry beans
and sunflowers; and vegetables, including cabbage,
cauliflower, cucumbers, lettuce, onions, peppers,
snap beans, spinach, sweet corn, tomatoes, sum-
mer and winter squash. The model has two sets of
constraints. The first are a fixed set of constraints,
Bjt$ with technical coefficients, A, and resources,
j, available in year t.
St. ~ ~ AikX1k ~ Bjt
(2) id kcK
{(jeJ; t=l, ...5}
Data from farm budgets by Lazarus and White
(1983), Phelps and How, and Snyder were used
for the objective function and technical coeffi-
cients. The fixed constraints included family and
hired labor by season. Labor is a seasonally binding
constraint that inhibits expanded cultivation of high-
value, labor intensive crops, such as cauliflower
and lettuce. Transfer rows are used to link pro-
duction and market activities.
Land available for cultivation is determined by
a set of flexibility constraints for the different crops.
This models the adjustment process. Flexibility
constraints for each crop are calculated by multi-
plying the upper and lower flexibility coefficients,
pi and ~i, respectively, by the amount of crop i
grown in period t – 1. The flexibility constraints
are
Acreage data to estimate the flexibility coeffi-
cients were provided by New York Crop Reporting
Services; and by Sanok. The constraints were set
by maximum historic changes [Appendix A].
Yields of potatoes are a stochastic function of
CPB population density. Farmers adapt to in-
creased CPB resistance to pesticides by changing
pest control strategies. Pest population dynamics
of the CPB are an important component of the
model. Adult pest densities have been shown by
Logan to be a function of degree-days. The func-
tional form used by Logan was estimated for Long
Island data collected in 1981 and 1982 using a
Maximum Likelihood technique. Non-linearities
prevented use of ordinary least squares (OLS) es-
timation.
where ‘D is the number of degree days at 10° cen-
tigrade, and bo, bl, b2, and b~ are coefficients. The
coefficients were adjusted for climate, soil type,
irrigation practices, and rotations [Appendix A].
These coefficients were used to simulate beetle
populations for subsequent runs of the model. The
variable ‘D was randomly generated using Monte
Carlo methods. The resulting predicted CPB pop-
ulations were used to simulate integrated pest man-
agement (IPM) activities, such as scouting and timing
of applications. Foliar pesticides were assumed to
be applied to potatoes only when CPB populations
exceeded the threshold (CPB *) for a given field.Baker Groundwafer Protection Policy 133
Farmers were assumed to use the thresholds pro-
vided by Wright et al. for CPB *. ] Scouting took
place in two week intervals from May to Septem-
ber. The model gave farmers a selection of methods
to control the CPB. The decision to spray is rep-
resented by the following conditional expression
{
ZO~, = a+ if CPBk, z CPB*
(5)
Z$k, = O if CPBk, < CPB*
where Z@T is the loading rate for pesticide * on
land k in scouting period ~ and o!+is the recom-
mended application rate for pesticide @. This re-
lation assumes both perfect information from
scouting and perfect compliance with label instruc-
tions. When pesticides are applied, a certain per-
centage of the beetles will be killed. This percentage,
known as the mortality rate, is a function of the
size of the dosage, the toxicity of, and the resis-
tance in the insects to the pesticide being used. The
rate of survival can be thought of as
(6) S@ = CPB,(l – M*), {0 ~ M ~ 1}
where S$7is the survival rate of CpBS treated with
pesticide $ in scouting period ~, and M+ is the
mortality rate for CPBS to pesticide. The insects
then recover from S@ and continue their growth.
This model assumes that growth rates are un-
changed by insecticide application within a season
and remain affected only by time and temperature.
The mortality rate declines over the years as the
insects become resistant to a given pesticide. This
introduces a recursive aspect to the model, requir-
ing a feedback loop that accounts for the declining
efficacy of a pesticide. This states that for a given
year, t, the mortality rate associated with a given
pesticide will be a function of whether that pesti-
cide was used the previous year. R. istheresistance
factor of pesticide*. This relationship is shown in
(7).
‘Mo(t - 1) if Zy(t - 1, = o.
Predicted potato yields were calculated from cu-
mulative CPB densities over the season. A linear
function estimated by Logan was used to capture
the plant/pest interaction.
) The objective of the analysis was more the prdction of farmer
behavior given existing information, rather than optimization of thresh-
olds. Therefore, exogenous, rather than endogenous tbreshnlds were
used, The optimal thresholds derived by Wright et al. should provide
results close to endogenously determined thresholds.
where $k is the predicted yield of potatoes on field
k, and ~k is the maximum potential yield of field
k, y is the slope of the plant/pest interaction (es-
timated by Logan to be O.000168); and ~. is the
cumulative number of degree days in period ~. The
expression in the brackets explains crop damage
as ‘a function of CPB population feeding over the
growing season. Populations are larger and more
active during warmer summers.
The pesticide loading rate for a field in a given
year is derived by summing over scouting periods
in the season (9).
(9)
The baseline model simulated farm production
and pollution without a ban on pesticides. A con-
straint is introduced to reflect the elimination of
the option to use banned pesticides. The baseline
model is modified to analyze how different polices
to protect groundwater change farm income and
pesticide loading rates. The first is the ban on the
pesticides aldicarb, carbofuran and oxamyl. Pest
control decisions were based upon a choice be-
tween the pesticides kryocide, fenvalerate and ro-
tenone.
Taxes and Subsidies
Taxes and subsidies offer farmers the opportunity
to reallocate resources when correcting an exter-
nality y. Several policy instruments are more likely
to improve environmental quality and maintain pro-
duction (Hochman, Zilberman, and Just). A tax on
agricultural inputs has several advantages over other
measures to remedy pollution. The cost to enforce
practices would be high compared with the cost to
set and collect a tax when many producers are
involved (Carlson).
Equation 10 gives the objective function for a
policy to tax, rather than ban, pesticides found in
the groundwater.
{t=l, ...5}
where @$is the tax on pesticide *. Only the banned
pesticides were taxed. Parametric programming was
used to derive the tax that would drive the banned
pesticides out of the optimal solution during an
average infestation. This would give farmers the134 October 1988 NJARE
option of applying materials that would otherwise
be banned during severe outbreaks, but at a much
higher price.
The next policy modelled was a subsidy for the
cultivation of crops that required few, if any, ag-
ricultural chemicals. These are predominantly field
crops with few pest, disease, or weed problems.
Crops suitable for cultivation on Long Island that
require few inputs and little labor include rye, oats,
wheat, soybeans, sunflowers, and dry beans. Other
than rye, these do not have a local market outlet,
and are less profitable than potatoes (Lazarus and
White, 1983), The subsidized objective function
is:
(ci~ – ;~i)xi~ – c~@,
{t=l, . ..5}. U,>0
where Ui is the subsidy for rye, oats, wheat, soy-
beans, sunflowers, and dry beans, and zero for all
other crops. A subsidy of $750 per acre was used.
This level was sufficient to put 50% of all potato
land into low-input crops. Annual payments ranged
between $4 and $7 million. Subsidies lower than
that would not offer farmers returns competitive
with potatoes, and would therefore not be effective.
Subsidies to achieve 100% participation would cost
over $1,000 per acre. At that level, the subsidy
would approach $20 million.
Integrated Pest Management (IPM) practices often
involve externalities and public goods problems.
If one farmer practices crop rotation as an 1PM
strategy, and his neighbors plant a host crop, that
crop can serve as a reservoir for a mobile pest. If
the host crop subsequently infests a rotated field,
the beneficial effects of crop rotation are negated.
Districts have been created for other crops to man-
age pest and disease controls. Examples are citrus,
cotton, and sugar-beet districts in California and
cotton pest control districts in North Carolina. A
similar district could be formed for potatoes on
Long Island.
Several tasks of the pest control district are sim-
ulated in the model. Specifically, these are that
potatoes cannot be grown on the same field in two
consecutive years. Pesticides are rotated to delay
resistance and are selected to reduce environmental
impacts to groundwater and wildlife. The district
also bears the cost of scouting, and application of
pest control materials. Participation is mandatory
and region-wide. The crop rotation requirements
of the pest control district are modelled by
(12) k~ Xkt <0.50 xk,,-,,,
P
where xk(~ ~~is the potato acreage in period t – 1
and xk~is the acreage in potatoes in period t. Equa-
tion (12) places an upper limit on the acreage of
potatoes following potatoes. Rotation from pota-
toes to grains are expected to disrupt the feeding
of the CPB (Lazarus and White, 1984). Pesticide
applications were limited to a synthetic pyrethroid
with low mammalian toxicity and short half-life,
fenvalerate, used with a synergist, PBO. A re-
quirement was made that at least one-fifth of the
applications use rotenone to forestall the build-up
of resistance. The policies described above were
analyzed for their effect on farm income, environ-
mental risk, and fiscal impact.
Policy Analysis
The effect of the different policies on farm income,
net of hired labor, variable costs, and purchased
inputs, are presented in Table 1. Discounting did
not change the ranking of policies. Income loss
associated with the ban on pesticides can be cal-
culated to be approximately $2.2 million undis-
counted over five years. The policy that results in
the highest farm income is the conservation sub-
sidy. This is followed by the baseline policy and
the policy that taxes the pesticides that have been
banned. The policies that ban the use of the car-
bamates aldicarb, carbofuran and oxamyl do not
yield as high an income as the previously men-
tioned policies. The policy with the lowest income
is the pest control district.
The conservation subsidy provides higher in-
Table 1. Average Annual Gross Margin
Under Different Policies















*The figures in parentheses represent government transfer pay-
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come, both through the subsidy itself, and through
releasing labor tied up in potato production to the
production of high value, labor intensive vegetable
crops, such as cauliflower, cabbage, sweet corn,
spinach, and onions. The subsidy was set to attract
one-third of the acreage in an average year. At this
rate, the subsidy accounted for about 1670 of farm
income over a five year period. If the subsidy was
too low, no farmer would adopt conservation prac-
tices. If the subsidy was set high enough, farmers
would grow nothing but subsidized crops. Setting
the optimal tax for polhttion policy is empirically
difficult (Baumol and Oates). If the tax is too low,
then the result is identical to the baseline, If the
tax is too high, the result is the same as a ban,
Parametric programming was used to set the tax at
a level that would eliminate the banned pesticides
in an average year. If a CPB outbreak was signif-
icantly greater than average, the banned pesticides
would enter the optimal solution.
Farm income under the Dest control district was
lower than other policies: despite the subsidized
services provided. The opportunity cost of restric-
tions on potato acreage more than offset the benefits
of pesticide rotation and free scouting. The pest
control district policy yields a farm income 49ioless
than the baseline and 15% less than the conser-
vation subsidy.
Too many factors are involved to confidently
predict the fiscal impact of different policies. The
cost of treating groundwater, or providing an al-
ternative source of drinking water for wells that
have already been contaminated is, in itself, a ma-
jor undertaking. The most fiscally attractive policy
]s the taxation-of pesticides, becuase it provides a
source of revenue. Each alternative to the baseline
policy has enforcement costs. While the baseline
policy has no direct administrative costs, the great
potential for leaching toxic chemicals makes its
cost unpredictable and possibly great. The current
policy of banning chemicals is attractive to regu-
lato~ agencies because of its predictability. Both
the conservation subsidy and pest control district
are potentially expensive.
Environmental Quality Indices
Economic effects alone would not adequately eval-
uate the different policies presented. Environmen-
tal risk is more difficult to quantify than farm income.
Simulation of groundwater flows were notably un-
successful at predicting groundwater contamina-
tion ex ante. Prediction of contamination levels
over a large region would be inaccurate. Even if
contamination levels could be accurately predicted,
those levels would require heroic assumptions to
translate them into dollar values.
Because of the multi-attribute nature of environ-
mental hazard, a single number cannot give an
absolute measure of risk. Pesticides have different
characteristics and properties that make them have
dissimilar environmental impacts. Volubility, ad-
sorption, volatility, persistence, and toxicity all
contribute to the probability that a pesticide will
leach into the water table and, if it does, the degree
of threat to public health. Some pesticides are more
toxic than others, some more persistent. Models
of solute transport are based on the interaction of
these physical, chemical, and biological charac-
teristics with soil, climate, management, and crop
cover. These quantitative attributes can be com-
bined to derive a relative measure of risk. The result
is an index that can be used to rank alternative
policies for their potential hazard to public health
and the environment. Two indices are presented
based on chemical and physical properties of dif-
ferent pesticides. Derivation and calculation of these
indices are explained in appendix B. The leaching
index gives an ordinal ranking of the likelihood
that pesticides will reach the groundwater under
different policies. The hazard index takes into ac-
count the acute toxicity of pesticides that are likely
to contaminate groundwater. The results of the en-
vironmental indices are given in table 2.
The baseline policy has the highest leaching po-
tential. This ranking reflects the high leaching po-
tential of aldicarb used under this policy. The
conservation subsidy has the lowest leaching po-
tential, because it encourages the cultivation of crops
that do not require the use of groundwater threat-
ening pesticides.
There are several differences between the rank-
ing of policies between the two indices. Rather than
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being the second most environmentally damaging
policy as the leaching index indicates, pest control
districts are the least damaging. This is brought
about by the substitution of pesticides with low
mammalian toxicity for more toxic ones used in
the other policies.
The baseline policy is unquestionably the most
harmful to human health and the environment. The
evidence of this is indicated by the contamination
levels of aldicarb and carbofuran in the drinking
water near potato fields. Aldicarb would remain
present in wells near fields in continuous potatoes.
The banning of these pesticides is a sound remedy,
and a good basis for other policies.
Conclusion
Research indicates that the ban on pesticides, while
burdensome to farmers, still results in a positive
return. Different policies to reduce pesticide use
beyond banning them had little impact on the po-
tential for groundwater contamination. Subsidies
for low-input crops offer farmers the highest return
of any policy, but at a cost for local government.
Environmental quality indices suggest that water
soluble carbamate pesticides ought not be used on
Long Island. Other policies yielded indices close
to one another, so the relative ranking may not be
robust. However, the policy with the lowest po-
tential for leaching pesticides is subsidy for con-
servation crops, while the one that poses the least
hazard to public health is the formation of a pest
control district.
One limitation of the model is that it does not
adequately reflect transition to non-agricultural uses.
Flexibility constraints control the pace at which
farmland is retired, and is a naive part of the model.
it is also limited because of the singular nature of
Long Island.
Land use is complicated by the large and grow-
ing non-farm population in the region. Agricultural
land preservation has cost local government mil-
lions of dollars, both through the purchase of
development rights, and through property tax in-
centives. Policy makers have been reluctant to im-
pose any regulations that would further jeopardize
Long Island agriculture. Polluting agricultural
practices have undermined the public support that
farmland preservation programs have received. The
benefits afforded by open space are negated by
groundwater contamination. Public policy on Long
Island seeks the means to preserve farmland and
preserve agriculture.
While Long Island is a unique situation, so is
every contamination incident. No single optimal
NJARE
policy can correct market failure in every case (Lip-
sey and Lancaster). This is particularly true of
groundwater contamination where specific condi-
tions and practices make generalizations mislead-
ing at best and impossible at worst. Long Island
offers useful lessons because of the severity of the
contamination.
Further research is required on the economics of
cultivating high value specialty crops with reduced
inputs. The lack of budgets for such cultivation
practices mean the conservation subsidy results may
not accurately reflect farm income and the fiscal
impact. Despite this, the conservation subsidy ap-
pears to be the most promising policy to protect
groundwater quality while allowing farms to re-
main solvent.
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Indices used in the study were based on the phy8ical,
chemical and biological characteristics that influence the
propensity of chemicals to leach into the water table and
cause acute toxicity to consumers. The fate of pesticides
depends on aqueous volubility (SOLO), measured in mg/
L; vapor pressure (VO), measured in Pascals; and ad-
sorption, (KocO), measured in L/Kg; and half-Iife (tv2J,
measured in days. Hydrogeology, soil and climate are
also important in determining fate of pesticides. How-
ever, for the purpose of this study, these are assumed
homogeneous for the study area.
Leaching potential increases as half-life and volubility
increase, and decreases as volatility (vapor pressure) and
adsorption increases. As vapor pressure increases, more
of the pe8ticide is volatilized and less is apt to reach the
groundwater. Similarly, if a pesticide is likely to be
adsorbed to soil particles, it is less likely to reach the
groundwater. A leaching index ba8ed on these principles
for each pesticide in the model (LEACH+) is presented
in B, (Laskowski, Goring, McCall, and Swarm).
(Bl)
‘EACH*= [(:%::1
The index is calculated by weighting the pesticide
loading rate of each pesticide in the model, Z,, measured
in pounds of active ingredients, by the characteristics for
each pesticide, LEACH+, and sttmrrted overall pesticides
(B2).
(B2) LEACH = ~(LEACH,)(Z,)
*N
Fkld Description Another index is constructed to take into account the
1 North Fork Irrigated Potato Land
2
acute toxicity of pesticide use under each policy. One
North Fork Unirrigated Potato Land
3 NorOr Fork Irrigated Field Land measure of acute toxicity is LD50, which is the lethal
4 Nonh Fork Unirrigated Field Land dosage for half of a test animal population in a controlled
5 South Fork Irrigated Potato Land experiment. As LD50 decreases, toxicity and therefore
6 South Fork Unirrigated Potatn Land
7 South Fork Irrigated Fletd Land hazard increase. Leaching potential is divided by
8 South Fork Unirrigated Field Land LD5W, the LD50 for each pesticide. This index is used138 October 1988 NJARE
again to weight the pesticide loading rates from the model.
This is represented by HAZARD in B3.
(b3) [1
HAZARD = ?W & (z,)
504,
While the hazard index offers some measure of threat
to human health, several precautions should be taken
when interpreting it. One cannot extrapolate the number
of poisonings from the index, without making very strong
assumptions about tbe functional form and relation be-
tween the characteristics in the index, as well as about
the population at risk. One can only say that, in com-
paring two policies, one with a higher hazard index has
a greater chance of causing acute toxicity incidents than
another. Theindices fail toaccount for chronic toxicity,
such as cancer, and fail to discount for future risks to
health. Synergistic effects are assumed to be nil, and the
by-products of the decay of pesticides are assumed to be
non-toxic. In spite of these limitations, the environmen-
tal indices here can be useful as guides for improving
policy.